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In this article I would like to give an answer to the following question: how 
can we be creative today? The question concerning creativity, though, is 
at the same time a question concerning future. There is a close connection 
between future and creativity1. Common sense doesn’t understand future 
just as what “comes next” in a hypothetical succession of facts: future, actual 
future, has to be something new, something never seen before, a true 
increment of the number of things existing or ever existed. The Italian 
semiotician and word-puzzle-maker Stefano Bartezzaghi has given a very 
interesting definition of creativity: “Creativity is to transform the present 
in order to make future better and to obtain a different future, 
better just because different” (Bartezzaghi 2013)2. 
The question asked in the beginning becomes then the following: how can 
we create something new? 
This question is particularly relevant today. I will argue that our conception 
of newness has radically changed, and has progressively obtained some 
features we could call “dialectical”. This means that our concepts of 
creativity, of newness and of future itself are plastic, historical, subject to 
our society’s material and cultural setting. The fact itself that creativity is a 
value – one of most widespread and undisputed assumption of our era – is 
not a given, but rather depends on a vast variety of contingent 
circumstances. If we have to answer to the question concerning creativity, 
we have to do it starting from today’s society. 
Another interesting element is that the question concerning creativity 
does somehow imply the problem of freedom, but is rather more specific. 
One can be free without being creative – at least according to a certain 
concept of freedom – and there can be freedom without future, but not 
creativity. That’s 
1 Franco “Bifo” Berardi (2011) offers a very interesting analysis of the problem of 
future, with brilliant insight to many matters that will be discussed in this article. His 
central thesis, that future is somehow exhausted in our digital era, is strictly 
convergent with the core statements of this essay. 
2 There are, of course, other ways to conceive creativity and future. I will focus on 
common sense precisely to point out that our need is to avoid an increment-based 
understanding of creativity, and rather focus on a qualitative conception of the notions 
of „creativity” and „future”.  
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why, in my opinion, it is creativity and not just freedom that has to be put in 
question in order to seriously investigate about our idea of future. 
Of course, asking the question implies that there is a problem with creativity. I 
will start by analyzing some key features of our society with regard to the 
discussed topic, focusing on three elements – quantity, perspective and 
distance. I will use my analysis as a basis for an attempt to show why I believe 
that creativity and future, even though they are at the core of today’s rhetoric, 
are actually in danger. 
After that, I will try and suggest a possible way out by sketching the outlines of 
an “ethic of self-limitation” as an alternative to the kind of uncreative freedom 
I individuate as a core aspect of our present condition. Finally, I will argue that 
the aesthetics endorsed by the authors of Oulipo (Ouvroir de littérature 
potentielle) can be interpreted as an interesting predecessor of my proposal. 
1. Quantity, Distance, Perspective. Outlines of Hypermodern
Society
A key feature of the present time for western societies is the passage from a 
post-modern to a hyper-modern condition. The prefix hyper- has been widely 
used in social sciences (Han 2014; Morton 2014, Sloterdijk 1995; Codeluppi 
2012)3, even though with different aims and meanings, but is always meant to 
indicate an actual paradigm shift. Postmodernity had been defined basically 
through negative features: end of big narratives (Lyotard 1979), erosion of 
some forms of belief that were typical in modern societies (Vattimo 1999), 
exhaustion of linguistic and artistic resources (Barth 1967, Eco 1983). On the 
contrary, it is interesting to remark that hypermodernity is defined positively 
through a set of features that can all be linked to technology and to the so-
called Information Revolution (Floridi 2014). 
The first core feature is quantity. In 2013 Google processed about twenty 
Petabytes (every Petabyte is a million of Gigabytes) of data every day. That’s 
about twice the space used by Youtube to store all its videos, or twenty times 
the space used by the US government to store the data of the census from 
1790 to 2000. Borges’ dizzying reveries about Babel Library are now not only 
actual, but even obsolete: we are now able to store not only texts, but also 
numbers, images, songs, videos4. 
All this is something quite different from the quantitative aspect of modernity 
many interpreters and intellectuals underlined and criticized. The 
hypermodern “Reign of Quantity” does not prefer quantity over quality, but 
3 I would like to point out that I use the term “hypermodernity” without any relation to 
the way it has been used by Paul Virilio and some other French thinkers (Lipovetsky, 
Serroy) during the last decades. 
4 The data are taken from Gunelius (2014). 
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rather shows that quantitative difference is at the same time qualitative5. 
Paraphrasing Hegel, quantitative transitions to qualitative, or, as someone 
recently wrote: “More isn’t just more. More is different” (Anderson 2008). All 
this has some very remarkable consequences. 
In 2008 Chris Anderson, Wired’s chief editor, wrote an article entitled The end 
of theory. The data deluge makes the scientific method obsolete (Anderson 
2008). According to Anderson we always had to elaborate theoretical models 
in order to select data and get results through approximation. Today, though, 
we do not need selection or approximation anymore, since we are in 
possession of informatic instruments able to process a huge quantity of data, 
and to interpret them individually. For this reason, traditional scientific 
method is doomed: a new setting appears, where it is not the model that 
makes data interpretable, but it’s rather data themselves that generate the 
model. According to Anderson, if “old” science was always oriented and 
originally tainted by some sort of bias, the new science of big data is agnostic: 
when facing the totality of data, we don’t need cuts, selections or orientations 
anymore. We just need data. 
Anderson writes: “This is a world where massive amounts of data and applied 
mathematics replace every other tool that might be brought to bear. Out with 
every theory of human behaviour, from linguistics to sociology. Forget 
taxonomy, ontology, and psychology. Who knows why people do what they do? 
The point is they do it, and we can track and measure it with unprecedented 
fidelity. With enough data, the numbers speak for themselves”. 
The new science of big data contradicts Aristotle’s famous statement, 
according to which there is only science of the universal. As the new 
personalized advertisement system on Google and Facebook shows, we have 
finally reached the science of the individual. In a formula, with the “Fourth 
Revolution” we have got to the point where the map and the territory are 
finally one. In this new science correlation substitutes causality6, and we have 
a complete, a-perspectival knowledge of data7. 
The lack of perspective is the second key feature of hypermodernity, an aspect 
to which Korean-German philosopher Byung-Chul Han has given much 
attention. Modern society, based on biopolitical forms of control, was 
5 The reference is to Guenon (2004). Understanding the difference between a 
quantitative society and a society where “quantity is quality” is fundamental in order 
to grasp the difference between modernity and hypermodernity. 
6 It is interesting to remark that this was exactly August Comte's hope about sciences 
in general, and social sciences in particular. The positive step of every science is 
reached exactly when we don't try to explain phenomena through causality anymore, 
but simply through correlation (see Comte 1830, 4). 
7 Since its publication, Anderson position has of course been widely discussed and 
criticized. What is interesting, though, is that such claims – until a few decades ago 
only possible in a sci-fi novel – are now possible in a serious scientific debate. For a 
deeper, updated and complete account of the question see Meyer-Scho nberger and 
Cukier (2013). 
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dominated by the idea of the panopticon. Now instead we live in a society 
where the purely numeric nature of information, and their elaboration by 
neutral processors and machines, makes the very idea of a perspective – even 
though “total” – obsolete. Some philosophers (Ferraris 2015) have mentioned 
the Hegelian absolute: the idea of a “pure” knowledge takes shape in a kind of 
science based on big data. This global and a-perspectival knowledge leads to 
the idea that Infosphere is some sort of “connective unconscious”: just like the 
old theological image of a hidden, all-knowing god, today we make the 
unsettling experience of a system that seems to know us better than we don’t 
know ourselves (DeKerchove 2015). 
Immediately linked with the lack of perspective is the absence of distance, 
spatial and temporal. New hypermodern society doesn’t rely much on the idea 
of bigger space and lesser times, but rather on the complete override of the 
notion of space and time itself. Instantaneousness dominates new 
technologies, and the instant is precisely what is outside of time. Distances are 
not simply reduced, they are made completely obsolete. What Marshall 
McLuhan indicated with the idea of an “imploded world” is now becoming real 
(McLuhan 1964). The notion of “global village” describes with accuracy this 
dimension: our global hypercommunity is based on a new form of mediatic 
orality, where every meeting and common experience is made possible by the 
sharing of a same non-space and non-time. 
The overriding of spatial and temporal distance doesn’t imply that space and 
time are obliterated, just like the transition of quantitative to qualitative 
doesn’t eliminate quantity. Our hypermodern society is dominated by a logic of 
addition, of constant quantitative increase (Han 2014). The formula “more 
isn’t just more, it’s different” must not let us forget that we are only talking 
about quantity, such a quantity that no finite mind can possibly deal with it. 
Our global village is immense and inexhaustible, it has more huts than we will 
ever be able to visit individually (as anyone who has subscription to Netflix 
knows too well). Some months ago a game entitled No Man’s Sky has been 
published. The game has been widely advertised by mentioning its most 
incredible feature: the player explores a universe made by more than 8 billions 
of billions of planets, a universe that will never fully discovered by any 
individual player. In its title No Man’s Sky expresses the essence of our reality, 
that is not man-oriented anymore8. Anthropocene is dominated by this 
fascinating contradiction: man has finally shaped the universe in his own 
image, but at the same time the society we live in seems to have reached a 
dimension that overpowers us9. 
8 A very similar idea has been expressed by the acclaimed movie Her (2013). 
9 The origin of this idea is, of course, Ray Kurzweil’s concept of singularity (see 
Kurzweil 2006). 
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2. Hypermodernity and Creativity
This analysis wasn’t meant to be either optimistic or pessimistic. The 
alternative between enthusiasm and scepticism can be avoided by assuming a 
critical stance, and this in the Kantian sense: what we need in fact is to 
determine the conditions of possibility and the limits of today’s condition. The 
main of condition of possibility, as seen, is given by the new technologies now 
massively operative in every heavily industrialized society. The main focus 
though are the limit, since it’s here that the topic of this article appears again. 
Paradoxically, the main and most apparent limit of hypermodern society is the 
absence of any other limit. 
The override of spatio-temporal distance has an immediate effect: the 
disappearance of future. The widespread slogan “Future is now” is not only 
brilliant, but also surprisingly true. Our present is utopian because it is non-
spatial, but is also chronical because our increased ability to predict the future 
allowed us to implement it in our present, to make it part of our life almost as 
if it were already actual. In a formula, future is already past. 
The first side-effect of our present obsession with the future is that the 
constant irruption of new devices and products is almost taken for granted. 
There is such a huge quantity of new things flowing in our experience 
everyday – and often at a very-well established pace – that we are hardly 
surprised by anything anymore. The huge spread of creative jobs, the 
celebration of originality at every cultural and productive level (from 
Kickstarter to contemporary art, from cinema to videogames) creates a 
paradoxical situation: we crave for newness, but there is nothing new about 
new. There are no limits to progress, to increase or to the potentialities of 
technology, at the point that any new product is something trivial, something 
largely predictable. 
The implementation of future in our present is one of the major risks and 
problem of hypermodern society. The expression “the present is pregnant with 
the future” states now an unsettlingly literal truth, i.e. that our future is now 
fallen into line with what already exists. Dominque Cardon (2015) underlined 
this problem talking about the algorithms used to process big data, since they 
tend to flatten any projection on what has already happened: Amazon suggests 
what has already been bought or is similar to what we have already been 
bought, or different according to strictly predetermined parameters. 
There is nothing we can’t do, and yet whatever we do has somehow already 
been done. That’s why in this society filled with creativity it is incredibly 
difficult to be creative. This also modifies our conception of freedom. The 
contraposition between negative and positive freedom is well established in 
our philosophical lexicon. And yet, both forms of freedom are possible in a 
setting where any kind of newness is excluded: the elimination of any obstacle 
to the free choice of individuals is not a problem, since our society doesn’t 
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express control in the form of prohibition anymore (Han 2016). In the same 
way, positive freedom to do something remains subject to the paradigm of 
choice between given alternatives: we are free to choose from a huge variety of 
options, but none of this can be compared with what tradition has given us 
under the name of creation. This is another feature of hypermodern society: 
creation is a non-creative process. 
A last problem rises from the last key feature mentioned, that is the lack of 
distance. The absence of distance comes together with the crisis of one of the 
most important paradigms of modernity, the distinction between subject and 
object. Postmodernism has largely criticized the notion of subject. 
Hypermodernity, on the contrary, shows that it is the notion of “object” to be 
problematic. Many authors (Latour 2005, Sloterdijk 2009) underlined how 
difficult it is to distinguish between subject and object in our present era. A 
reason for that is that it is quite hard to find an object that doesn’t possess, at 
some level, a kind of subjectivity (let’s think about Internet of things) or that 
doesn’t become constituent part of a subjectivity (our smartphones are a good 
example). The complete absence of distance between us and the prostheses 
and devices we use is problematic because it is a pre-conscious relationship. 
Technology is a second nature because it is a form of artificial immediacy, a 
condition in which we don’t apply any distance between us and objects. The 
critical category of “reification” expresses the idea that the object dominates 
us, shapes us no less than we shape the object itself. In a formula: we don’t use 
technology, but we are immersed in it (Ippolita 2012). Our ability to 
metabolize and internalize the use of devices up to making it natural makes us 
free and powerful, but channels our possibilities of action in a pattern that has 
already been pre-determined by devices themselves. Again, this does not 
necessarily have to be bad: what is evident, though, is that the only true 
creative subject is the scientific-technological apparatus as a whole. McLuhan 
was right again: technology seems to be the true subject of history. 
3. Creativity and Self-Limitation
It is now time to get to the pars construens of the article, and to answer to the 
question: how can we be creative today? I have argued that the absence of 
limits is the main limit to creativity of our society. I will suggest that the 
restoration of limit is a possible answer to our question. First of all a 
clarification is needed: my answer is oriented toward an individual ethics, 
whose main aim is to preserve a certain possibility for human experience. Just 
like my analysis of hypermodern society, also my proposal for an individual 
ethic of limit is articulated in three points. 
Firstly, in order to limit quantitative hypertrophy we need a qualitative limit. 
This is very important, since my proposal has very little to do with degrowth, 
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but rather focuses on a qualitative reorientation of life. Minimalism is focused 
on the idea of a quantitative limit, whereas an ethic of self-limitation endorses 
the idea of a qualitative criterion of selection for any content, object or task we 
want in our life. The experience of newness, in this sense, does not rely 
anymore on the concept of something “more” coming into our life, but rather 
on the idea of a personal rearrangement of what already is. According to this 
new stance, more is just more: what is different, on the contrary, is our 
selection, disposition and use of the existent. 
The second important aspect is the recovery of distance. In order to reacquire 
an objective, thus conscious and aware relationship with technology and with 
the devices we use to act and think, we need set a distance between us and 
those devices10. This means first of all that it is necessary to acquire some 
minimal competencies about the devices we use, but also that we have to be 
able to experience life without them in order to grasp the difference. The aim 
of an ethic of self-limitation is to make our relationship with technology 
something more than an automatism, and thus to make us able to act on 
technology as well as through it.  
Finally, we need to reacquire perspective, or the ability to have an individual 
perspective: the advent of the Absolute dreamed by some philosophers means 
somehow the end of the human dimension of existence. In this sense, the 
reacquisition of a perspectival dimension allows us to reacquire a creative 
stance towards experience. Of course this has nothing to do with 
perspectivism: to reacquire perspective doesn’t mean to promote subjective 
opinions over truth, or partiality over impartiality. It simply means to preserve 
full awareness of one’s own position in the world, along with the ability to 
elaborate this position independently. 
These three aspects go somehow together. We are can’t really operate a 
selection and limit our fruition of products without acquiring competencies 
and setting a distance between us and media or products. At the same time, 
operating such a selection is precisely what makes our perspective individual. 
Now, one could ask if such an ethic already exists. I would like to suggest that 
the demands I just listed are at the core of a French and Italian literary current 
started in the middle of last century. The Oulipo (Ouvroir de litte rature 
potentielle) was founded in 1960 by Raymond Queneau and the 
mathematician Jacques Roubaud, and with an aim very similar to that I have 
outlined in these pages. Surrealism had endorsed an idea of artistic creativity 
that was founded on some quite interesting principles: abolition of the 
separation between subject and object (celebration of dream and of 
subconscious); complete absence of spatial, stylistic and lexical limits, up to 
10 This problem is particularly important with regard to new generations. Digital 
natives are in fact completely submerged in digital technology, but at the same time 
show much less awareness that those who experienced the diffusion of personal 
computers, mobile phones or the Internet. On the topic see Thomas 2011. 
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the point to be allowed to write meaningless texts; depersonalization of the 
author (automatic writing). It’s easy to see that these principles look very alike 
the three basics of hypermodern society (quantity, distance, perspective). 
Queneau’s main idea was that writers, when left completely free and without 
any limit, are subject to a great deal of automatisms (Queneau was the editor 
of Koje ve’s lectures on Hegel, and knew very well the notion of second nature). 
According to Queneau, the idea of spontaneity is substantially a myth.  
Against this paradigm of creativity, Queneau elaborates a theory that is 
radically different, and is based on the notion of contrainte, that is a self-
imposed limitation. According to this method the writer arbitrarily chooses its 
own limits, he writes on the basis of completely external rules, without any 
relation to its style or intention. The result, according to Queneau, is a superior 
awareness in writing, the liberation of language from automatisms and the use 
of authentically creative processes. As Queneau writes: “The classical writer 
that writes his tragedy observing a certain amount of rules he knows is more 
free than the poet who writes whatever comes to his mind, and who is slave of 
other rules he ignores” (Queneau 1981)11. 
Here Queneau is talking about freedom, not about creativity. A reason for that 
is that Queneau keeps some Hegelian points of view with regard to practical 
philosophy. Anyway, his discourse can be extended to creativity as well: any 
creative act is made possible by a form of subjectivation that finds its core in 
establishing a limit. In this case there can still be freedom because it is a form 
of self-limitation, an autonomous act. Paradoxically, it is exactly the lack of 
limits that is forced onto us by society: the specific condition of our age forces 
us to redefine some categories and some classical positions. Subjectivation in 
itself is an act of self-limitation: by choosing our own limits, we refuse those 
imposed externally by our social context. 
Oulipo’s stance is really peculiar. Contemporary literature often criticizes 
society in its content, but duplicates it in the form. The idea of “maximalist 
novel” (Ercolino 2014) basically indicates a work that is hypertrophic and 
exceeds any given classical structures, and is generated through a logic of 
addition. Maximalist novel looks very much alike the world it describes: 
Oulipo’s novels don’t look like anything. Let’s see, as an example, the novel A 
Void (La disparition) by Georges Perec. The novel is quite famous because it 
has been entirely written without ever using the vowel “e”. Even though the 
work doesn’t touch social or political topics, it is evident that Perec’s aim is 
ethical: in the afterword to the novel he writes that such a choice is an attempt 
to free and rescue language. This is at the same time an attempt to react to 
postmodernism, that is the idea that “everything has already been written”. 
Perec’s problem is precisely our problem: how to be creative in a setting 
11 My translation (see also Calvino 1988). 
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where there is no possibility for new words, new plots, new characters12? 
Perec’s response doesn’t rely on the content, but rather on the very form of 
writing and of artistic creation in itself. In the same way, an ethic of self-
limitation is not based on any kind of “maxim”, does not offer any determinate 
rule. On the contrary, it endorses the idea of rule in itself, the need to switch 
our focus from contents to criteria used to select those contents13. 
Let’s consider our initial question once again: how do we create something 
new? It is clear that we must first of all ask ourselves: what do we mean by 
“new”? According to the definition we have given above, there is a strict 
relationship between “new” and “more”: we create something new only 
insofar we create something “more” than what already exists. But is this 
necessary? As it has been shown, it is precisely this relationship between 
“new” and “more” that has to be put in question in order to understand the 
difficulties of today’s society. 
4. Conclusion
Oulipo’s poetics can teach us something about how to live creatively in a world 
suspended between the constant, passive irruption of new possibilities and 
the exhaustion of actual resources and ideas. The shift from quantity to quality 
is related with the need to focus our attention not just on the contents, but also 
on the form, i.e. on the way these contents are experienced, selected, used. 
This means that we must abandon the idea that a creative act is just the 
production of something new, and understand it rather as a reorientation, a 
selection of an individual path in a given set of possibilities. 
As already pointed out, this proposal is only consistent as a form of individual 
ethic. There are already many public debates about the need to set new limits 
for scientific research, for technological production, for publication or fruition 
by the masses. These debates are not object of this article, since here the main 
focus is on the attempt to preserve a kind of experience, along with a certain 
way to live. From this standpoint, this ethic must be understood first and 
foremost as an ethos, a way of life, whose main aim is aesthetic much more 
than “moral” (even though, of course, creativity is in this case implicitly 
understood as an intrinsic value). 
12 At the same time, it is interesting to point out that there is another problem, 
opposite to this: how to be creative in a setting where there are infinite words, plots, 
characters, elements to choose among? Oulipo’s approach is impossible in world 
featuring infinite possibilities. That’s why the first necessary step is to show that this 
(quantitative) infinity is more a boundary than an enhancement to creativity. 
13 It is interesting to remark that Hegel shared a similar suspect toward “new” 
contents, and emphasized in the same way the importance of paying attention to the 
form (see Hegel 2008, 4). 
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A last element to consider is the account of digital age that has been given. The 
aim of this paper was not to depict our era as an age of crisis and despair: the 
paradoxical condition of creativity is one problematic aspect of a time that, 
just like every time, has its own distinctive elements, its potentialities and its 
limits. It is not necessary for everyone to be creative. And yet, it is fundamental 
to grasp what it means to be creative in a given time, and how to be it. 
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Limit and Creation Towards an Ethic of Self-Limitation in the Digital Era. 
Abstract. Aim of this article is to analyse the relationship between 
creativity, freedom and future in contemporary society. The main focus is on 
the notion of creativity in our digital era. Common sense understands 
creativity as a concept implying something new, something original that did 
not exist before. And yet in our society the constant overflow of news, 
products and contents doesn’t surprise anymore, is no longer connected to 
a truly creative act. The complete lack of limits seems to be our society’s 
own limit, since newness is not experienced anymore as something really 
new. The solution to this situation is a new ethic of self-limitation that 
reshapes our idea of creativity and bases it on different criteria. The first 
part of the article is an analysis of hypermodern society. Hypermodernity 
is defined through three features: quantity as a qualitative element, 
override of distance, sublation of perspective. Unlike postmodern 
society, hypermodernity defines itself positively on the basis of some 
technological and social results that are experienced as improvements. In 
the second part of the article the paradox of hypermodern society is 
discussed: despite its obsession for newness, despite the huge spread of 
creative jobs and the passion for future, newness seems to be something 
given and usual, being creative means conforming to given standards, 
and future is almost completely implemented into present. In the last part 
of the article I argue that a solution to this situation is an ethic of self-
limitation, in which a rediscovery of limit leads to a new concept of creativity 
no longer based on quantitative increment, but rather on the ideas 
of qualitative selection, objective distance, personal perspective. According 
to this view, being creative is no longer a matter of content, but rather of 
form. I will also argue that the aesthetics of Oulipo, a French literary 
movement of the Sixties, already expressed this stance in a very similar 
situation. 
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